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Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd.: The
United States Supreme Court Eliminates
the American Rule to the
Warsaw Convention
By LARRY MOORE*
I. INTRODUION
In Chan v. Korean Air Lines,' the United States Supreme Court
eliminated the notorious American Rule,2 which interpreted the Warsaw
Convention3 (modified by the Hague Protocol4 and the Montreal Agree-
ment'). However, the Court left intact the delivery defense with regards
to the Convention.
The case arose from the aircraft disaster of September 1, 1983, in-
volving Korean Air Lines Flight 007 which accidentally strayed over the
Soviet Union and was shot down. The crash resulted in the deaths of 269
passengers and crew members. Since the incident occurred while the air-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Fogelman School of Business, Memphis State University;
B.A., Vanderbilt University; M.A. Memphis State University; J.D., Washington University.
1. - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 1676 (1989).
2. Ludecke v. Canadian Pacific Airlines, 98 D.L.R.3rd 52 (Can. 1979). See infra text
accompanying note 10 for a discussion of the American Rule.
3. Convention for Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation
by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Warsaw Con-
vention], reprinted in 49 U.S.C.A. § 1502 note at 430 (West 1976). The original Treaty Na-
tions were: Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt,
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Latvia,
Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Rumania, Soviet Union, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia. Warsaw Convention, supra, at 3014, T.S. No. 876,
137 L.N.T.S. at 13, reprinted in 49 U.S.C.A. § 1502 note at 430 (West 1976).
4. The Hague Protocol, Sept. 28, 1955, 478 U.N.T.S. 371. This agreement was ratified by
the other member nations in 1955, but was so unpopular that it was not submitted to the
United States Senate for confirmation until 1959. It was still the subject of bitter debate in
1966 when the Montreal Agreement took effect. The Protocol was never formally ratified in
the United States. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention,
80 HARV. L. REV. 497, 498-501 (1967).
5. Agreement Relating to Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention and the
Hague Protocol, May 16, 1966, CAB 18900, approved by order E-23680, 31 Fed. Reg. 7,302
[hereinafter Montreal Agreement], reprinted in A.F. LOWENFELD, AVIATION LAW CASES
AND MATERIALS 434 (Documents Supp. 1972).
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plane was engaged in an international flight, the Warsaw Convention,
which governs such flights, was in effect. The Warsaw Convention limits
damages to US $75,000 per person in an aircraft disaster. The plaintiffs
filed a motion for summary judgment pleading the Montreal Agreement,
which requires that all notices pursuant to the Warsaw Convention be
given in ten-point type. The Warsaw notice on the tickets of these pas-
sengers was in eight-point type. The trial court denied the motion.6 The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld this decision.7 Pre-
viously the United States Courts of Appeal for the Second and Fifth Cir-
cuits had ruled in similar cases that the Warsaw Convention limitations
were void and allowed unlimited liability.' This decision, in effect, ig-
nored the American Rule in applying the Warsaw Convention. The
United States Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, and thus effectively terminated the American Rule
as a trial tactic.9
The American Rule simply holds that in an aircraft disaster involv-
ing an international flight and personal injury or death, there is a limita-
tion on the amount which can be recovered pursuant to the Warsaw
Convention and its subsequent modifications. However, this limitation
shall be removed, and the defendant airlines will be subject to unlimited
liability, when the notice of this limitation is in fine print.l° The Montreal
Agreement requires ten-point type size or larger."
Chan is of major importance in the area of international transporta-
tion law since it brings the interpretations of the Warsaw Convention by
the United States federal courts in line with the courts of the rest of the
world in the determination of damages for personal injury or death aris-
ing out of an airline accident during an international flight.
The Warsaw Convention set very definite limits on the amount of
damages that could be collected as a result of an air disaster. This al-
lowed the member nations to the Convention to conduct their interna-
tional flights with the assurance that, regardless of the origination or
destination of a flight, their exposure for damages in an accident would
6. In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 664 F. Supp. 1463 (D.D.C. 1985).
7. In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1987),
aff'g 664 F. Supp. 1463 (D.D.C. 1985).
8. Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966); In re Air Crash
Disaster at Warsaw, Poland, 705 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1983); In re Air Crash Disaster Near New
Orleans, LA, 789 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1986).
9. Chan v. Korean Air Lines, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 1676, 1681 (1989).
10. Ludecke v. Canadian Pacific Airlines, 98 D.L.R.3rd 52, 56-57 (Can. 1979).
11. Montreal Agreement, supra note 5, para. 2, reprinted in A.F. LOWENFELD, supra note
5, at 434.
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be uniform from nation to nation, except for cases of willful or deliberate
injury. However, in the past when a United States court had jurisdiction,
many foreign carriers frequently discovered to their shock that these
courts allowed the plaintiff, through judicial interpretation, to obviate the
Warsaw Convention and collect unlimited damages contrary to the letter
and spirit of the Convention. This separate American Rule caused con-
fusion and chaos in the international airline industry and resulted in
enormous economic consequences for both United States and foreign
companies. In Chan, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the
right of Congress to make treaties without modifications by the courts.
This decision restored order and predictability to airline damages in in-
ternational cases.
By eliminating this rule, the United States Supreme Court finally
resolved sixty years of questions surrounding this controversial treaty
and reversed lower court decisions that consistently tried to avoid the
limits that had been set forth in the Convention and its additions. This
Article examines the historical background of this decision, including the
Warsaw Convention, the Hague Protocol, the Montreal Agreement, the
American Rule; the Chan case itself; and Chan's impact on American
case law in international transportation law.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The Warsaw Convention
The Warsaw Convention and its modifications and additions govern
the liability of airlines for loss or injury that results from an aircraft acci-
dent while the aircraft is either involved in an international flight, or
serving as a leg of any other international flight.12 It limits recovery for
personal injury, death, or property damage that may result from such a
flight. 3 The Warsaw Convention, enacted in 1929, stated as its purpose
the protection of the fledgling aviation industry from disastrously large
judgments that could result from an air accident and the provision of
some uniformity among countries as to the content of tickets, baggage
claim checks, and airbills. 4 Indeed, most of the information on the stan-
dard airline ticket is required pursuant to the Warsaw Convention. In
cases of death or personal injury, the total damages allowed under the
initial treaty was 125,000 Poincar francs or 8,300 United States dollars. 15
12. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 4, at 498-501.
13. Id. at 499.
14. Id. at 498-99.
15. Id. at 499.
1990)
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From the beginning the United States saw this amount as too low. 16
Criticism of the Convention was intense 7 and reached a peak following
Ross v. Pan American Airways. 8 The Ross case arose when an American
entertainer was critically injured while on a United Service Organizations
[hereinafter USO] tour during World War II. The New York Court of
Appeals held that the Warsaw Convention applied and the promising
young star's recovery was limited to US $8,300.19
In addition, a technical interpretation of the Warsaw Convention
could lead to discrimination among individuals injured or killed in the
same accident. For example, if a plane bound from New York to Paris
crashed in international waters, all aboard the airplane would be subject
to the limitations of the Warsaw Convention. However, if a flight from
Chicago to New York crashed, victims traveling entirely within the
United States would not be subject to the limitations, whereas victims
whose journeys began outside the United States would be subject to such
limitations."
B. The Hague Protocol
American complaints lead to an attempt by some treaty nations to
modify the treaty amount in such a way as to satisfy the United States
without offending other nations.21 A compromise resulted in the 1955
Hague Protocol, which raised the treaty limits to 250,000 Poincar francs
or 16,600 United States dollars.22
C. The Montreal Agreement
This increase of the treaty limits did not satisfy discontent within
the United States. The debate within the Office of the President and the
Congress over ratification of the Hague Protocol lasted for ten years. In
1965 the United States officially filed a Notice of Denunciation of the
Convention, which not only rejected the Hague Protocol, but was the
first step toward a withdrawal from the Warsaw Convention altogether.
23
The United States was prepared to withdraw unless the treaty limit was
16. Id. at 504.
17. Id. at 502-04.
18. 299 N.Y. 88, 85 N.E.2d 880 (1949).
19. Id. at 92-99, 85 N.E.2d 882-86.
20. See Egan v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 21 N.Y.2d 160, 234 N.E.2d 199, 287
N.Y.S.2d 14 (1967).
21. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 4, at 506-07.
22. Id. at 504-09.
23. Id. at 510, 545-52; see also Notice Of Denunciation, 53 DEP'T ST. BULL. 923, 924-25
(1965).
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raised to at least US $100,000.24 This led to months of negotiations be-
tween nations and airlines in an attempt to keep the United States a party
to the Warsaw Convention.25 In a somewhat unusual, final effort to save
the Convention, the private air carriers of the member nations met in
Montreal, Canada, and with strong persuasion and some arm twisting by
their own governments, entered into a private agreement26 raising the
limit to US $75,000.27 The Montreal Protocol also established the ten-
point type standard for notice of the limitations.28
D. The American Rule
The American Rule developed in a line of cases that allowed cir-
cumvention of the Convention limits if the notice of limitation was not
printed in ten-point type or larger.2 9 After the controversy raised by the
harsh results, at least by American standards, in the Ross Case,3° Ameri-
can courts began to look for an avenue of escape from the terms of the
Warsaw Convention. Initially, there appeared to be two sections which
provided defenses to the Warsaw Convention by which relief could be
granted: article 3 of the Warsaw Convention31 and the Montreal
24. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 4, at 552.
25. Id. at 549-5 1.
26. Id. at 595-96.
27. Id.
28. Montreal Agreement, supra note 5, para. 2, reprinted in A.F. LOOWENFELD, supra note
5, at 434; Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 4, at 597-98.
29. See Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, 370 F.2d 508, 514 (2d Cir. 1966); Deutsche
Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft v. C.A.B., 479 F.2d 912, 914 (D.C. Cir. 1973); In re Air Crash
Disaster at Warsaw, Poland, 705 F.2d 85, 90 (2d Cir. 1983); In re Air Crash Disaster Near
New Orleans, LA, 789 F.2d 1092, 1098 (5th Cir. 1986); Egan v. Kollsman Instrument Corp.,
21 N.Y.2d 160, 171, 234 N.E.2d 199, 202-03, 287 N.Y.S.2d 14, 19-20 (1967).
30. See Ross v. Pan-American Airways, 299 N.Y. 88, 85 N.E.2d 880 (1949).
31. Article 3 provides:
(1) For the transportation of passengers the carrier must deliver a passenger
ticket which shall contain the following particulars:
(a) The place and date of issue;
(b) The place of departure and of destination;
(c) The agreed stopping places, provided that the carrier may reserve the right
to alter the stopping places in case of necessity, and that if he exercises that
right, the alteration shall not have the effect of depriving the transportation of its
international character;
(d) The name and address of the carrier or carriers;
(e) A statement that the transportation is subject to the rules relating to liability
established by this convention.
(2) The absence, irregularity, or loss of the passenger ticket shall not affect the
existence or the validity of the contract of transportation, which shall nonetheless be
subject to the rules of this convention. Nevertheless, if the carrier accepts a passen-
1990]
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Agreement.32
Defenses to the Warsaw Convention, for the purposes of this Arti-
cle, are: (1) delivery defenses-a ticket was not delivered pursuant to
article 3 subsection 2 of the Warsaw Convention; and (2) notice de-
fenses-the notice found on a particular ticket did not conform to section
2 of the Montreal Agreement.33
Ross, although unsuccessful, was one of the first cases to challenge
the Warsaw Convention based upon delivery. The plaintiff, Janet Ross,
was a performer for the USO during World War II. The Army bought
the airline tickets for the performers, who had been assembled without
knowledge of their destination or departure date. An agent took the per-
forming troupe to the airport and gave a ticket and passport to each
performer. When the plaintiff received her ticket, she tore off the ticket
stub. The agent then took the tickets, handed them to the ticket taker,
and held the passports in his custody.34
The plaintiff argued that the agent's actions did not constitute deliv-
ery of a ticket. Since the plaintiff never had the ticket, she was unable to
read the notice of limited liability. Furthermore, she argued, the agent
ger without a passenger ticket having been delivered, he shall not be entitled to avail
himself of those provisions of this convention which exclude or limit his liability.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 3, 49 Stat. at 3001, T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. at 15-17,
reprinted in 49 U.S.C.A. § 1502 historical note at 431 (West 1976).
32. The Montreal Agreement provides in relevant part:
Each carrier shall, at the time of delivery of the ticket, furnish to each passenger
whose transportation is governed by the Convention... in type at least as large as
10 point modem type and in ink contrasting with the stock on (i) each ticket; (ii) a
piece of paper either placed in the ticket envelope with the ticket or attached to the
ticket; or (iii) on the ticket envelope:
For such passengers on a journey to, from, or with an agreed stopping place in
the United States of America, the Convention and special contracts of carriage em-
bodied in applicable tariffs provide that the liability of certain (name the carrier) and
certain other carriers parties to such special contracts for death of or personal injury
to passengers is limited in most cases to proven damages not to exceed US $75,000
per passenger, and that this liability up to such limit shall not depend on negligence
on the part of the carrier. For such passengers traveling by a carrier not a party to
such special contracts or on a journey not to, from, or having an agreed stopping
place in the United States of America, liability of the carrier for death or personal
injury to passengers is limited in most cases to approximately US $8,290, or US
$16,580.
Montreal Agreement, supra note 5, para. 2, reprinted in A.F. LOWENFELD, supra note 5, at
434-35 (footnote omitted).
33. This Article does not deal with Article 25 of the Warsaw Convention, which elimi-
nates the limitation of liability in cases when the accident was caused by the "willful miscon-
duct" of the carrier. Warsaw Convention, supra, note 3, art. 25, 49 Stat. at 3020, T.S. No. 876,
137 L.N.T.S. at 27, reprinted in 49 U.S.C.A. § 1502 historical note at 434.
34. Ross, 299 N.Y. 88, 93-95, 85 N.E.2d at 880, 883-84.
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was not her agent but was an employee of the USO. However, the New
York Court of Appeals ruled that this was a delivery of a ticket stating:
"[Ilt was no concern of the carrier as to what the arrangements were
between the passenger and the person who took delivery of the ticket."35
The effects of the Ross interpretation were modified in Warren v.
Flying Tiger Line.3" In Warren, the United States government con-
tracted with the Flying Tiger Company to transport ninety-two troops to
Vietnam in March 1962. Upon arrival at the airport, each soldier re-
ceived a boarding ticket. A soldier had to show this ticket before he was
allowed to board. The ticket did not conform to the Warsaw Convention
since the Warsaw limitation was printed on the back in fine print that
was difficult to read without a magnifying glass. The plane made inter-
mediate stops in Hawaii, Wake Island, and Guam. It disappeared after
leaving Guam on route to the Philippines and was never heard from
again. 7
Although the Ninth Circuit noted that the tickets contained a warn-
ing that was in fine print, the court chose not to consider this in their
final decision.3 1 (However, since this was a pre-Montreal Agreement
case, the ten-point type size requirement was not yet established.) In-
stead, the Ninth Circuit focused its analysis on the question of delivery:
After delivery of the ticket, was there enough time for the soldiers to
obtain other insurance coverage beyond the Warsaw limits? The Ninth
Circuit ignored the fact that the plane made several stops where the
soldiers could have bought additional insurance and ruled that the tickets
were not delivered in such a manner as to allow the troops an opportu-
nity to obtain additional insurance.39 The Ninth Circuit apparently be-
lieved the delivery question alone was enough to resolve the matter.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided
Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line' during the same year as Warren. In Mer-
tens, Lieutenant Mertens was killed in an air crash in Japan. Mertens
was accompanying some military materials that were on board the plane.
His ticket was not presented to him until he was aboard the plane. Un-
like Warren, Mertens was not given any notice regarding liability limits
prior to boarding the plane and since the plane did not land on route, he
did not have an opportunity to buy additional insurance. As in Warren,
35. Id. at 98, 85 N.E.2d at 886.
36. 352 F.2d 494, 495-97 (9th Cir. 1965).
37. Id. at 497.
38. Id. at 498.
39. Id.
40. 341 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1965).
1990]
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the Second Circuit ruled this was not delivery for purposes of the War-
saw Convention since the deceased was not afforded an opportunity to
obtain other insurance to compensate for the low limits of the Conven-
tion. The Second Circuit again ignored the argument that the ticket was
technically delivered.41
In Warren and Mertens, the courts moved away from the technical
meaning of delivery of a ticket, which served as the basis for the decision
in Ross, and considered whether the ticket was delivered in such a fash-
ion as to allow the passengers an opportunity to obtain extra insurance
after receiving the ticket. If delivery did not afford such an opportunity,
there was no delivery of a ticket pursuant to the Warsaw Convention.
The rulings from Warren and Mertens were expanded by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee
Aeree Italiane.42 In Lisi, an Italian plane crashed in Ireland while on
route to the United States.4" The Second Circuit relied on dicta in War-
ren that stated that the notice of the Warsaw limitations was in such fine
print as to be no notice at all.' Thus, in Lisi, the Second Circuit ruled
that the size of the print was so microscopic that for Warsaw Convention
purposes it was the same as no notice and therefore required that the
judgment limitations be removed.45
The mandatory type size of the Montreal Agreement became the
sole issue in In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland.46 In this case,
the warning was printed in 8.5-point type by the Polish airline.47 Eight
of the nine decedents were members of the United States Amateur Box-
ing Team.4" The defendant airline argued that the type was large enough
and delivered in a timely enough manner that the deceased had actual
notice of the Warsaw limit.49 The Second Circuit rejected this argument
on grounds that the Montreal Agreement now required ten-point type
and failure to meet this requirement eliminated the Warsaw protection.5°
The same rule was followed in In re Air Crash Disaster Near New
Orleans.51 In this case, the required notice was in nine-point type, not
41. Id. at 853, 856-58.
42. 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1983).
43. Id. at 510.
44. Id. at 513-14.
45. Id. at 514.
46. 705 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1983).
47. Id. at 86.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 88-89.
50. Id. at 89-90.
51. 789 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1986).
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the ten-point type required by the Montreal Agreement. 52 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the ten-point re-
quirement was mandatory for Warsaw protection and removed the limit
on liability.5
The New York Court of Appeals, which imposed the Warsaw Con-
vention limits in the controversial Ross case, refused to apply the Con-
vention in the unusual case of Egan v. Kollsman Instrument Corp. 54 In
Egan, Mrs. Seiter bought a roundtrip ticket from New York City to Van-
couver, Canada. Since bad weather had cancelled all flights out of Van-
couver, Mrs. Seiter took a bus to Seattle, cashed in part of her ticket, and
caught her scheduled flight to Chicago." In Chicago, she missed her
flight to New York,56 but she obtained a new ticket for another airline's
flight to New York. The plane crashed while attempting to land in New
York.57 The Warsaw notice on the initial ticket was printed in 4.5-point
type.58 Despite the fact that Mrs. Seiter bought an extra US $25,000 in
insurance before she left the New York airport and another US $50,000
in insurance before she left the Seattle airport, the court ruled that be-
cause of the type size, the notice provision was insufficient under the
Warsaw Convention to place the deceased on notice. 9
III. THE CHAN CASE
In Chan, the United States Supreme Court addressed the question of
the Warsaw Convention for the first time in the Convention's sixty year
history. In this case, a Korean airliner, traveling from New York City to
Korea, strayed over the Soviet Union's territory and was shot down by a
Soviet warplane.60 The Warsaw Convention notice was printed in eight-
point type instead of the ten-point type required by the Montreal Agree-
ment.6 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia noted the
type size did not comport with the Montreal Agreement, but upheld the
District Court's denial of the plaintiff's motion to remove the protection
52. Id. at 1095.
53. Id. at 1098.
54. 21 N.Y.2d 160, 234 N.E.2d 199, 287 N.Y.S. 14 (1967).
55. Id. at 164-67, 234 N.E.2d at 200, 287 N.Y.S. at 15-16.
56. Id. at 165, 234 N.E.2d at 200, 287 N.Y.S. at 16.
57. Id., 234 N.E.2d at 200, 287 N.Y.S. at 16.
58. Id. at 164, 234 N.E.2d at 200, 287 N.Y.S. at 16.
59. Id. at 167 n.3, 168-72, 234 N.E.2d at 201 n.3, 202-04, 287 N.Y.S. at 18 n.3, 18-22.
60. Chan v. Korean Air Lines, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 1676, 1677-78 (1989).
61. Id. at -, 109 S. Ct. at 1678.
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of the Warsaw Convention.62
This decision conflicted with precedents in other circuits. In resolv-
ing this conflict, the Supreme Court found that the Montreal Agreement
imposes no sanction for failure to comply with its ten-point type require-
ment. The delivery of a ticket with a smaller type size, although techni-
cally a violation of the Montreal Agreement, could not be the basis for a
denial of the limitation provided by the Warsaw Convention. 63
The Supreme Court attacked the line of cases which held issuing a
ticket that failed to provide adequate notice of the Warsaw Convention
limitations amounted to nondelivery of the ticket.' The Court held that
such decisions amounted to a modification of a treaty, despite the clear
text of such treaty.65 In moving away from the decisions of American
courts for the past forty-one years the Supreme Court stated:
These estimations of what the drafters might have had in mind are of
course speculation, but they suffice to establish that the result the text
produces is not necessarily absurd, and hence cannot be dismissed as
an obvious drafting error. We must thus be governed by the text-
solemnly adopted by the governments of many separate nations-
whatever conclusions might be drawn from the intricate drafting his-
tory that petitioners and the Solicitor General have brought to our
attention. The latter may of course be consulted to elucidate a text that
is ambiguous .... But where the text is clear, as it is here, we have no
power to insert an amendment.66
The concurring opinion of Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Mar-
shall, Blackmun, and Stevens, however, indicated a willingness to retain
the American Rule in a modified version.
If notice is indeed required, it must surely meet some minimal stan-
dard of "adequacy." All would agree, no doubt, that notice that liter-
ally could be read only with a magnifying glass would be no notice at
all.... But there is a substantial difference between 4-point and 8-point
type, particularly where, as here, the notice took the form of the "ad-
vice" prescribed by the Montreal Agreement and occupied a separate
page in the ticket book. It cannot be said that the notice given here
was "camouflaged in Lilliputian print in a thicket of [other
conditions]. ' 67
62. In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1987),
aff'g 664 F. Supp. 1463 (D.D.C. 1985).
63. Chan, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. at 1681-82.
64. Id. at -, 109 S. Ct. at 1680.
65. Id. at -' 109 S. Ct. at 1680-84.
66. Id. at -' 109 S. Ct. at 1683-84.
67. Id. at -' 109 S. Ct. at 1692.
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The concurring opinion also indicated that these Justices would be
willing to keep the question open as to what is proper notice in order to
retain the right to prohibit inadequate notice.68
The Supreme Court leaves no doubt that lower courts must strictly
interpret and adhere to the Warsaw Convention and may not exploit mi-
nor technicalities to circumvent the damage limitations of the Conven-
tion. The American Rule is officially dead.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Chan opinion reopens the controversy in the United States sur-
rounding the Warsaw Convention. The United States has never agreed
with the limitations placed on recovery in aircraft disasters. Even the
1966 increase of the limit to US $75,000 was still less than the minimum
dollar level that the United States espoused as necessary and adequate
compensation-and that was twenty-three years ago. 69 The 75,000 dol-
lar limit has not increased since 1966. Thus, with price inflation, the
amount has become even more inadequate.
Prior to Chan, the only avenue of relief from these limitations that
did not require a showing of willful negligence on the part of the airlines
was the delivery provisions of the Warsaw Convention and the case-law
defense of notice. Now, the United States courts must strictly enforce
the Warsaw Convention and the notice avenue of relief is closed.
The Supreme Court's elimination of the notice defense renders what
has always been seen as a bad law even worse. The forces that were
temporarily mollified after the Montreal Agreement (probably not so
much from the increase in liability that the Agreement allowed, but be-
cause the Agreement provided an avenue for escaping liability limits alto-
gether) have now been provided with a major reason to again declare war
against the Warsaw Convention, unless they are headed off by a new
adjustment in the Montreal limitation figures.
In light of history and inflation, raising the recovery limit may ward
off conflict over the Warsaw Convention. This process, if history is any
guide, will be difficult. There were two areas of early conflict: (1) the
conflict between the United States and the other member nations who
were content with the low liability levels and did not want any increased
limits; and (2) the conflict in the United States caused by those who were
willing to abandon the Warsaw Convention because they believed that
the limits were far too low. Therefore, any solution must be aimed at
68. Id., 109 S. Ct. at 1692.
69. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 4, at 547-50, 595-96.
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resolving both. conflicts at the same time. One way of achieving this goal
would be to get an average figure for the actual damages now awarded in
member nations for injuries and for deaths arising out of domestic acci-
dents. The member nations would then have a true economic basis for
what these societies believe is the actual value of such an accident. This
value could form the basis for another Montreal-type agreement. This is
a better approach to the problem than merely having State Department
officials decide upon an arbitrary figure as they did in Montreal. In this
manner, a figure could be reached that reflects more closely the member
nations beliefs as to the true economic value of an injury. While this
method, or any other developed method, would be far from perfect, fail-
ure to achieve limits that are considered fair, especially in the United
States, will only lead to United States courts once again trying to find a
way to circumvent the limits.7°
70. Following the decision of the Supreme Court, a D.C. District Court jury in the case
still found unlimited liability based upon "willful misconduct" on the part of the airlines and
awarded a verdict of $50,000,000 to 137 victims, a matter certain to be appealed. Though the
issues surrounding print type may have been resolved, the Chan case is far from finished.
Chicago Daily L. Bull., Aug. 3, 1989, at 1, col. 2.
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